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Insuring the Stewardship of Bt Corn:
'A Carrot' versus 'A Stick'
Paul D. Mitchell, Terrance M. Hurley,
Bruce A. Babcock, and Richard L. Hellmich
Subsidies and fines are compared to voluntary and mandatory refuge insurance
(insurance for pest damage on Bt corn refuge) as mechanisms for securing grower
compliance with EPA refuge mandates. A conceptual model partially ranks mechan-
isms. Tradeoffs between mechanisms using grower welfare, payments to growers,
and monitoring frequency are quantified empirically. Grower welfare is lowest with
mandatory insurance because growers pay all costs, and is highest with direct refuge
subsidies because public funds or companies subsidize all costs. Assuming typical
premium loads and ignoring distribution considerations, we develop monitoring bud-
gets for fines and subsidies, above which voluntary or mandatory insurance is better.
Key words: biotechnology, European corn borer, refuge insurance, resistance man-
agement
Introduction
Recent applications of genetic engineering in agriculture include the insertion of a gene
from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) into corn. The resulting Bt corn pro-
duces proteins that are toxic when consumed by the European corn borer (ECB) Ostrinia
nubilalis and other lepidopterous insects. The high efficacy of Bt corn has resulted in
rapid and widespread adoption since its commercial introduction in 1996. In 1999, an
estimated 26% ofU.S. corn acreage was planted to Bt corn [U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) 2000]. Adoption has slowed due to market uncertainties, low commodity
prices, and less severe ECB infestations. Nevertheless, Bt corn still represented almost
20% of U.S. corn acreage in 2000 and 2001 (U.S. Department of Agriculture/National
Agricultural Statistics Service).
The high efficacy and rapid adoption of Bt corn raise concerns that ECB will become
resistant to the Bt toxin. Insects have previously developed resistance to highly effective
and widely used pesticides, including Bt (Tabashnik). Growers have little incentive to
voluntarily manage resistance because pests are treated as common property (Carlson
and Wetzstein). Concerns about Bt resistance are heightened because Bt pesticides are
natural, impose fewer environmental and human-health risks than synthetic pesticides,
and are one of the few pesticides available to organic growers.
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The Environmental Protection Agency believes insect resistance management (IRM)
is in the public interest and mandates IRM plans for Bt corn (U.S. EPA 1998). Current
plans use a high-dose refuge strategy requiring growers to plant non-Bt corn as refuge.
Refuge allows Bt-susceptible ECB to survive and mate with the few resistant ECB
emerging from Bt fields, thus slowing the proliferation of resistance and prolonging the
efficacy of Bt (Ostlie, Hutchison, and Hellmich). But because planting refuge restricts
a grower's ability to manage ECB, growers who find Bt corn profitable are financially
burdened by refuges and have little incentive to voluntarily comply. As a result, the
EPA is concerned that growers may plant too little or no refuge acres.
Anonymous survey data collected by seed companies suggest 85-95% of farmers com-
ply with the refuge requirement. The proportion of acres represented by these farmers
is not clear. Furthermore, given the sensitivity of the survey questions and lack of
independent verification, actual compliance is likely lower (U.S. EPA 2000).
The EPA response to compliance concerns is twofold. First, it requires Bt crop regis-
trants to (a) submit a detailed compliance program, (b) conduct compliance surveys, and
(c) implement intensified grower education in areas with compliance problems (U.S.
EPA 1999b). Second, at a special workshop and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Scientific Advisory Panel on Bt plant pesticides, the EPA
requested expert and public comment on compliance issues and methods to improve
compliance, such as education, fines, refuge insurance, and sales incentives (U.S. EPA
1999a, 2000). As a result of these comments, the EPA concluded:
To achieve a high level of grower compliance, a specific program may need to be
developed for Bt corn to ensure grower conformity and penalize noncompliance. A
number of different compliance mechanisms have been proposed by various stake-
holders, but there are uncertainties regarding many of the proposed mechanisms and
that [sic] further study regarding IRM compliance is needed (U.S. EPA 2000,
p. IID43).
The purpose of this study is to alleviate some of the uncertainty surrounding proposed
mechanisms. We develop a refuge insurance model to compare insurance-based com-
pliance mechanisms to more traditional mechanisms. Refuge insurance-single-peril
insurance for yield loss due to ECB-ensures compliance by reducing the cost of refuge
and because insurance claims can be denied to noncompliant growers. Using grower wel-
fare, payments to growers, and monitoring frequency, subsidized and mandatory refuge
insurance are compared to direct subsidies and fines.
Conceptual Framework
Assume pest control with insecticides is not economical, a realistic assumption for refuge
corn and ECB in most of the Midwest (Demetra et al.). The model can be adapted to
circumstances where the assumption is not realistic. Pest damage causes proportional
yield loss (Hennessy; Lichtenberg and Zilberman; Marsh, Huffaker, and Long; Saha,
Shumway, and Havenner). Per acre grower returns with the conventional crop are -o =
py(l - A) - c, where p is crop price, y is Bt corn yield, X is yield loss due to ECB, and c is
production cost.
We treat price and the production cost as known, to focus on the pertinent sources
of uncertainty. Bt yield is unconditionally distributed with density b(y) to capture
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uncertainty due to weather, random input availability, and other pests and pathogens.
Proportional yield loss due to ECB cannot be directly observed under ordinary field con-
ditions, but is estimated using stalk tunneling by ECB. The conditional density h(X I\ s)
captures the stochastic relation between yield loss X and stalk tunneling s. The condi-
tional density w(s | n) captures the dependence of tunneling on the pest population n.
Because s depends on n, and X depends on s, X also depends on n. The pest population
follows the unconditional density v(n).
If growers pay a technology fee T to purchase Bt seed, returns for a noncomplying
grower planting only Bt corn are ltBt = py - c - T. Returns for a complying grower plant-
ing the required proportion of refuge 4) are c(4 )) = 4 [py( 1 - A.) - c] + (1 - ()) [py - c - T]. Let
U(') denote grower utility, where U'( ) > 0, and U"( ) < O0. Assumingy and X are indepen-
dent, expected utility is written as:
E[U(n)] =f f f f U(n(y, X))b(y)h(Xls)w(s n)v(n)dndsdldy.
Cc, the unique cost to a grower of voluntarily complying with the refuge requirement,
is implicitly defined by:
(1) E[U(T(C()) + CC)] = E[U(7Bt)].
This compliance cost is a grower's incentive to violate the refuge mandate. If Cc < 0,
growers voluntarily comply, a case not of interest here. If Cc > 0, Bt corn increases aver-
age profit, reduces profit risk, or both, and growers do not voluntarily comply.
Given s, the monetary value of the expected loss due to pest damage is:
L(s) =pE[y]EI[Xs] = p yb(y)dy fx h(Xs)dX.
The indemnity I(s) equals the expected loss minus the deductible D, and is censored at
zero:
(2) I(s) = Max{L(s) - D, 0}.
Returns for a complying grower receiving the indemnity I(s) on refuge acres without
paying a premium are 7Tj()) = 4 [py(l - X.) - c + I(s)] + (1 - () [py - c - T]. The actuarially fair
premium M is the expected value of this indemnity:
(3) M = f I(s)w(sJn)v(n)dsdn.
The actual premium is 4M(1+ P), where P is the load required to cover adjustment, mon-
itoring, and administrative costs.
The motivation for using a deductible with refuge insurance is quite different than
for traditional insurance. The deductible for refuge insurance serves as a policy instru-
ment for managing compliance incentives and not as a mechanism for managing moral
hazard or adverse selection.
Voluntary Mechanisms
Refuge insurance can secure compliance with the refuge requirement if the insurance
benefit meets or exceeds any profit and risk benefit provided by Bt corn, plus the
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adjustment, monitoring, and administrative costs of the insurance. In this case,
E [U(7TI(() - M(1 + P))] > E [U(nBt)]. The unique maximum load P, a grower is willing to
pay for voluntary insurance and still comply with the refuge mandate is implicitly defined
by:
(4) E[U(nI((t) - 4M(1 + Pv))] = E[U(TBt)].
If the actual load P exceeds this maximum load Pv, the grower will not voluntarily buy
insurance and comply, nor will a private market for refuge insurance exist. However,
if ,v > p, the grower will voluntarily buy insurance and comply, and consequently a
private market for refuge insurance should emerge. An insurance market for ECB loss
currently does not exist, providing a strong indication that the risk benefit of refuge
insurance does not cover the adjustment, monitoring, and administrative costs. In this
case, refuge insurance requires subsidization to secure grower compliance. The minimum
subsidy needed is the difference between the actual load and the maximum load growers
are willing to pay: (M(P - Pv).
A direct refuge subsidy given to growers when they purchase Bt corn (e.g., as a price
reduction for non-Bt seed) can secure voluntary compliance. Monitoring is required
because growers can accept the subsidy and still plant only Bt corn. Let a be the proba-
bility a grower is inspected. Assume inspection correctly identifies compliant and non-
compliant growers, and that noncompliant growers must return the subsidy. The unique
minimum subsidy which secures compliance, Ss > 0, is implicitly defined by:
(5) E[U( c() + Ss)] = E[aU(7Bt) + (1 - a)U(7B + S)].
The subsidy works only if E [U(Tc(4) + Ss)] > E [U(rTB)], which implies it exceeds the cost
of compliance. Because Ss is a decreasing function of a, it is possible to optimally balance
the cost of direct subsidies with the cost of monitoring.
Compulsory Mechanisms
If the load growers are willing to pay does not cover the actual load, and the political
will to subsidize a voluntary compliance program does not exist, growers could be
required to purchase refuge insurance. With mandatory insurance, growers buying Bt
corn pay an additional (M(1+ p) for insurance, whether they want it or not. However,
noncompliance can be optimal even with mandatory insurance. If the deductible is large
and the technology fee is small, Bt corn is relatively cheap and eliminates losses even
when the insurance deductible is not met. Thus, mandatory insurance secures compliance
only if E[U(7rI(4)- (M(1+ p))] > E[U(TBt - 4M(1+ +3))]. As both I(s) and E[U(7TI(4))] are
non-increasing in the deductible, given the load, a unique maximum deductible (DM)
exists for mandatory refuge insurance that secures compliance:
(6) DM = Max[DIE[U(i1i(4) - 4M(1 + P))] = E[U(TBt - )M(1 + ))]].
With preferences exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), mandatory insur-
ance can secure compliance without a subsidy by setting the deductible D < DM to ensure
E [U(ir1(4))] 2 E [U(TBt)] . Whatever load is required to cover adjustment, monitoring, and
administrative costs can then be charged without affecting compliance incentives,
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because E[U(i(4) - (4M(1 + P))] > E[U(nBt- (M(1+ P))] implies E [U(7I(4)))] > E[U(TcB)] for
nonrandom ()M(1+ p) and CARA preferences.
With more general preferences, the deductible D can be subsidized to guarantee com-
pliance. The magnitude of this subsidy depends on the expected loss. If L(s) < DM, no
payment is needed. If D > L(s) > DM, the necessary payment is the difference between
the loss and maximum deductible, L(s) - DM. If L(s) > D, the payment is the difference
between the actual deductible and maximum deductible, D - DM. On average, the pay-
ment is ()Pr[D > L(s) > DM](L(s)- DM) + 4Pr[L(s) > D](D - DM).
Compliance can also be secured by combining fines with monitoring. Again, if a is the
inspection probability, inspection correctly identifies compliant and noncompliant grow-
ers, and inspected noncompliant growers pay a fine. The unique minimum fine (F) which
secures compliance is defined by:
(7) E[U(ic((4))] = E[aU(T7Bt - F) + (1 - a)U(Bt)].
The minimum fine is decreasing in a, so compliance can be assured with a high fine and
infrequent monitoring, within the political, legal, and financial constraints of such a
policy. Alternatively, given a mandated fine F, equation (7) can be explicitly solved for
the minimum inspection rate a needed to secure compliance.
Comparing Mechanisms
Each mechanism uses a different approach to secure compliance. Voluntary insurance
uses subsidized insurance as a "carrot" to secure grower compliance. Fines rely on moni-
toring and penalties for noncompliance as a "stick." By forcing growers to buy insurance
and using the indemnity to entice compliance, mandatory insurance combines a "carrot"
with a "stick." Refuge subsidies also mix a "carrot" and a "stick" by using a payment to
entice growers to comply, but withdraw the payment if they are caught cheating.
Each mechanism can be compared based on payments to growers, the monitoring
frequency, and grower welfare. The payment to growers is denoted by (M(P - Pv) for
voluntary insurance. For mandatory insurance and CARA preferences, no payment
to growers is required. With more general preferences, the expected payment secur-
ing compliance is specified as 4Pr[D > L(s) > DM](L(s)- DM) + 4Pr[L(s) > D](D- DM).
Direct subsidies require at least Ss in payments to growers, while fines require no
payments. In general, we cannot rank these payments, but payments to growers are
always minimized with a fine scheme and, if preferences are CARA, with mandatory
insurance.
Adjustment, monitoring, and administrative costs are embodied in the load with both
insurance programs, so payments to growers already account for these costs. Fines and
subsidies require monitoring, and the cost of this monitoring depends on the inspection
frequency; for the same frequency, monitoring costs should be comparable.
When payments to growers are the minimum needed to secure compliance, grower
welfare with a direct subsidy is higher than with voluntary insurance, and is higher with
voluntary insurance than with a fine [compare equations (4), (5), and (7)]. By assumption,
growers are better offwith voluntary insurance than with mandatory insurance [compare
equations (4) and (6)]. In general, growers can be better or worse off with mandatory
insurance than with a fine.
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Growers do best with a subsidy because, while they are compensated to plant a
refuge, they can still not plant the refuge, and then forfeit the subsidy only if they are
inspected and caught cheating. Because monitoring is intermittent, the subsidy must
exceed the cost of compliance, which drives average profit above what is obtained from
planting only Bt corn without accepting a subsidy. With insurance, growers receive a
payment only for losses on the refuge. If insurance is voluntary, growers must be given
an incentive to buy the insurance. This incentive must make them as well off as when
planting only Bt corn without insurance, but will still be less than what they receive
with the subsidy program. Making insurance mandatory eliminates this incentive
payment, but growers will not be as well off as when planting only Bt corn, because they
must forfeit the insurance indemnity to do so. Growers receive no payments with a fine,
so if they comply, average profit must be lower than when they plant only Bt corn, which
is what they receive with voluntary insurance.
Based on these comparisons, one cannot say one program dominates another in the
Pareto sense. Subsidies are good for growers, but may require substantial expenditures
from whoever pays the subsidy, plus someone must pay the monitoring costs. Voluntary
insurance is also good for growers, but may require subsidy payments, particularly if the
insurance has a small risk benefit and requires a large load. Mandatory insurance can
eliminate payments to growers, but because growers pay both the monitoring and
insurance costs, it may substantially reduce grower welfare relative to other programs.
Growers are not as well off with fines as with voluntary insurance and direct subsidies,
and, though payments to growers are unnecessary, monitoring costs may be high. To
reduce some of the ambiguity concerning the relative costs and benefits of each compli-
ance program, the conceptual model is parameterized using recent field data.
Empirical Model
For b(y), the distribution of pest-free yield, we use a beta density and parameters consis-
tent with dryland corn in Boone County, Iowa. Minimum and maximum yields are 0 and
212 bushels/acre and shape parameters are 3.26 and 1.61, giving a mean of 141.9
bushels/acre and a standard deviation of 41.2 bushels/acre. Following the empirical
results of Showers et al., pest-free yield is assumed uncorrelated with the ECB population.
State average ECB populations (second-generation ECB per plant), derived from data
described by Bullock and Nitsi, were available for Illinois (1943-1984,1987-1996), Min-
nesota (1963-1998), and Wisconsin (1963-1998). Calvin reports similar data for Boone
County, Iowa, and Hall County, Nebraska, for 1960-1969 using Hill et al. Because
populations must be positive, lognormal and gamma distributions were estimated via
maximum likelihood. Time trends, found to be statistically insignificant at the 5% level,
were removed. The lognormal distribution was employed because it had the largest maxi-
mized value for the likelihood function with the same number of parameters (Pollak and
Wales). The Durbin-Watson test indicated no autocorrelation in the errors, in agreement
with the findings of Chiang and Hodson; Chiang et al.; and Showers et al. As a result,
an unconditional lognormal distribution was used for v(n), the distribution of the annual
ECB larval population. Table 1 reports parameter estimates for each location.
Data were obtained from Monsanto on the average ECB larvae per plant and average
tunneling (cm) from Bt field trials conducted in nine states in 1997. Because Bt corn
Mitchell et al.
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Table 1. Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of the Mean and Coefficient of Vari-
ation for v(n), the Lognormal Density of ECB Larvae per Plant
Standard Coefficient Standard
Location Mean Error of Variation Error
Illinois 1.12 0.12 0.71 0.09
Minnesotaa 0.81 0.12 0.94 0.15
Wisconsin a 0.55 0.09 1.06 0.18
Boone County, Iowab 0.85 0.24 0.92 0.28
Hall County, Nebraskab 1.80 0.30 0.53 0.13
a Based on state data from Bullock and Nitsi.
b Based on county data from Calvin.
Table 2. Maximum-Likelihood Parameter Estimates for w(s In), the Log-
normal Distribution of Tunneling Conditional on the ECB Larval Popula-
tion, and for h(X I s), the Distribution of Proportional Yield Loss Conditional
on Tunneling
Lognormal Distribution of w(s I n) a Cobb-Douglas Model of h(X Is)b
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Parameter Estimate Std. Error
a1 2.56 0.839 K 0.033 0.015
a2 5.65 1.022 z 0.660 0.188
bo 3.40 0.756 r| 0.102 0.012
b, 1.73 0.553
a The conditional mean of w(s I n) is aln + a2,-n, and the conditional standard deviation is bo + bin.
b The parametric form of the model is X = KsZ + ie, where e - N(0, 1).
completely controlled ECB, only data from 211 non-Bt fields were used for estimation.
Incidence of tunneling must be positive; therefore, maximum-likelihood models were esti-
mated using a gamma and lognormal density for the distribution of tunneling conditional
on ECB larvae. A linear model was used for the standard deviation.
Combinations of linear, quadratic, negative exponential, square root, and hyperbolic
terms were evaluated for mean tunneling as a function of the larval population, imposing
a zero intercept in all cases. The best fitting model (R2 = 0.822) included both a linear
and square root term, and used the lognormal distribution since it had the largest
maximized value for the likelihood function (Pollak and Wales). Thus, tunneling has a
lognormal density with conditional mean ain + a 2 Fn and conditional standard deviation
bo + b1n, where a,, a2, b0, and b1 are estimated parameters (reported in table 2).
Data from experiments conducted in 1995 near Ames, Iowa, were used to estimate the
distribution of proportional yield loss conditional on stalk tunneling. Non-Bt corn and
a Monsanto Bt event in the same hybrid were exposed to an artificial ECB infestation
and a natural infestation with no pest control, and with two different insecticides. Bt
plots had almost no tunneling, so their average yield was used to calculate proportional
yield loss.
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Nonlinear maximum-likelihood models were estimated for mean proportional yield
loss as a function of tunneling, including negative exponential, logarithmic, and com-
binations of linear and square root terms. A univariate Cobb-Douglas model gave the
best fit (R2 = 0.347): X = KSZ + rje, where K, z, and q1 are parameters to estimate, and
- N(0, 1) is a random error. The maximum-likelihood parameter estimates are pre-
sented in table 2. The low correlation between tunneling and yield loss, and hence the
low R2, is typical (Berry and Campbell; Lynch, Robinson, and Berry) because factors
other than tunneling contribute to deviations from pest-free yield (Bode and Calvin;
Jarvis et al.).
Due to random environmental factors, some (27%) of the observed yield losses were
negative. The estimated model preserves this property of the data. With the estimated
parameters, expected yield loss exceeds 100% at 179.6 cm of tunneling, and the probabil-
ity that realized tunneling exceeds 100% reaches 5% at 135.9 cm of tunneling. Reported
results censored realized losses at 100%, but because this level of tunneling is unlikely
for the estimated model, the constraint was never binding.
Grower Preferences
As an approximation of farmers' preferences, CARA is assumed. The coefficient of abso-
lute risk aversion (R) was set so that the risk premium is a reasonable percentage of
the standard deviation of per acre returns (Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman). Bt corn and
refuge insurance did not greatly affect the standard deviation of returns, even when the
ECB population mean was varied from 0.5 to 2.0 and its coefficient of variation ranged
from 0.5 to 1.25. For the five locations, the standard deviation ranged from $83.12 to
$78.39, with an average of $81.29. Ra = 0.005057 corresponds to a risk premium equal
to 20% of $81.29, and is consistent with moderate risk aversion.
Let CE, be the certainty equivalent for i e {C, I, Bt}. With CARA utility, equations (1),
(4), (5), and (7) can be solved explicitly for the quantities of interest (i.e., compliance cost,
maximum load, minimum subsidy, and minimum fine, respectively):
(8) Cc = CEB - CEc,
(9) Pv = ((CE, - CEBt)/M) - 1,
(10) Ss = [ln(exp(RaCc) -1 + a) - ln(a)]/Ra,
(11) F = [ln(exp(RaCc) -1 + a) - ln(a)]Ra.
While S. and F are generally not equal, they are here because of the nature of CARA
preferences. Solving equation (6) explicitly for the maximum deductible DM is not
possible, but with CARA preferences, a unique DM exists and can be found numerically.
Following EPA requirements for unsprayed refuge acres, we set $ = 0.20.
Because integrating to obtain expected utilities and to find the premium defined by
equation (3) is analytically intractable for the specified distributions, Monte Carlo inte-
gration was used (Greene, pp. 192-95). Using algorithms from Press et al., a C++ program
was employed to draw the required random variables; 50,000 random variates from each
probability density were sufficient for estimates to stabilize.
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Empirical Results
Fair Premiums and the Cost of Compliance
With the estimated damage model, average yield loss due to ECB ranged from 9.3% in
Wisconsin to 17.5% in Hall County, Nebraska, which exceeds the average annual U.S.
yield loss of 6.4% estimated by Calvin. The model was estimated with data from one
location and year, for a hybrid known to be susceptible to ECB damage, using rather high
artificial infestations. To calibrate the model, average damage is proportionally reduced,
holding the coefficient of variation constant to preserve observed variability. Reducing
damage by 50% gives average damages ranging from 4.6% in Wisconsin to 8.7% in Hall
County, Nebraska, damage percentages which are closer to Calvin's estimate.
The current technology fee of about $10/acre seems a reasonable deductible, because
refuge corn must lose this much before it is less profitable than Bt corn. With a corn
price of $2/bushel and mean yield of 141.9 bushels/acre, a $10 deductible implies a 3.5%
loss. Table 3 reports actuarially fair premiums for each location with different deduct-
ibles. Premiums are reported as (M to spread the cost over the whole field.
Because gross revenue is linear in price and pest-free yield, a price increase with a
constant mean and variance of yield has the same impact as a mean yield increase with
a constant price and yield variance. As gross revenue increases, premiums increase more
than proportionally because the value of losses increases and it becomes more likely that
losses exceed the deductible. As a factor to adjust premiums, empirically the arc elasticity
of the premium with respect to the price or mean yield is about 1.4.
The cost of compliance (Cc) reported in table 3 is largest in Hall County, Nebraska
($2.35), where the ECB mean population is highest, and is lowest in Wisconsin ($0.31).
To indicate the sensitivity of Cc to key parameters, increasing the corn price 25% to
$2.50/bushel increases Cc about 25%, and "doubling" risk aversion to a 40% risk prem-
ium (Ra = 0.011078) decreases Cc by approximately 30%.
Voluntary Mechanisms
Table 3 also reports Pv, the maximum premium load a grower is willing to pay and still
comply when refuge insurance is voluntary. Because P, < 0 for all locations and deduct-
ibles, voluntary insurance requires a premium subsidy to secure compliance, even if
premiums are actuarially fair. When Pv < - 1, as occurs with a $20 and a $30 deductible,
even free insurance does not secure voluntary compliance, and growers must be paid to
accept the insurance and comply.
Sensitivity analysis explored these results. The ECB population mean was varied from
0.5 to 2.0, the coefficient of variation from 0.5 to 1.25, Ra from 0.001232 to 0.011078 (a
risk premium representing 5%-40% of the profit standard deviation), and the price of
corn from $1.80 to $2.50. The magnitude of Pv changes, but not the finding that P, < 0,
with Pv < -1 in most cases, especially with higher deductibles.
As no market for ECB insurance previously existed or has recently emerged, Pv < 0
is not surprising. Because Bt corn increases average profit in the examples, Pv < -1 is
also not surprising. With fair premiums, refuge insurance has no effect on average
profit, but when fair premiums are loaded, refuge insurance decreases average profit.
Insurance provides a risk benefit, but so can Bt corn. As a result, for refuge insurance
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Table 3. Actuarially Fair Premiums by Location, Assuming CARA Utility with
a 20% Risk Premium (R. = 0.005057)
Location
Boone Co., Hall Co.,
Description Deductible Illinois Minnesota Wisconsin Iowa Nebraska
<------------------ ($/acre) ---------------------
Compliance Welfare (CEc) -74.05 74.72 75.23 74.65 73.19
Compliance Cost (Cc) - 1.49 0.81 0.31 0.89 2.35
Maximum Deductible (DM) -13.44 14.58 17.96 14.37 13.47
Fair Premium ((M) 10 2.03 1.36 0.90 1.42 2.98
Fair Premium (4M) 20 0.76 0.43 0.24 0.46 1.37
Fair Premium ()M) 30 0.27 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.55
Fair Premium (4M) DM 1.48 0.81 0.31 0.88 2.34
Maximum Load (Pv) 10 -0.73 -0.60 -0.34 -0.62 -0.78
Maximum Load (Pv) 20 -1.95 -1.89 -1.31 -1.91 -1.71
Maximum Load (Pv) 30 -5.58 -5.76 -4.49 -5.76 -4.25
to secure compliance, high subsidies are required to compensate growers for the higher
average profit foregone on refuge acres.
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 has led to a substantial increase in the
premium subsidy for federal crop insurance programs. As a result, many growers have
crop insurance coverage on their Bt corn fields. This crop insurance should reduce the
refuge insurance premium, if large losses due to ECB are covered by crop insurance and
not refuge insurance. Crop insurance will then reduce demand for voluntary refuge
insurance, especially if the refuge and the Bt corn can be insured as separate units. Both
of these effects would change the premium subsidy needed for voluntary refuge insur-
ance to secure compliance.
Based on our empirical analysis, the effect of crop insurance on fair premiums is great-
est in Hall County, Nebraska, where ECB pressure is highest. However, ECB losses are
rarely high enough to trigger crop insurance payments; thus, incorporating crop insur-
ance into the analysis has little effect on the findings. At the 65% coverage level, crop
insurance reduces fair refuge insurance premiums less than $0.01/acre for all deduct-
ibles, and less than $0.10/acre with 75% coverage. The effect on the premium subsidy
needed for refuge insurance to secure compliance is similar.
Figure 1 shows the direct refuge subsidy required to secure compliance for each of the
five locations examined. At low levels of monitoring, the subsidy rapidly decreases as
the inspection rate increases-for example, falling more than 50% when the rate increases
from 5% to 10%. A large subsidy is required at low inspection rates because the payoff
to accepting the subsidy and complying must exceed the payoff to accepting the subsidy
and cheating, with some probability of being caught and having to return the subsidy.
Compulsory Mechanisms
For CARA utility with a 20% risk premium, table 3 reports DM (the maximum deductible
that secures compliance with mandatory insurance) and the associated fair premium.
DM exceeds the assumed $10/acre technology fee. Comparing expected profit for Bt corn
and for insurance without a deductible suggests this outcome is always likely. With
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Figure 1. Minimum subsidy (Ss) or fine (F) required to secure
compliance at each location, assuming CARA utility with a 20%
risk premium (R. = 0.005057)
CARA utility, mandatory insurance with a $10 deductible secures compliance, but not
with a $20 or a $30 deductible.
Figure 1 plots the minimum fines which secure compliance at each location. Large
fines are needed at low inspection rates, so that the expected cost of cheating is suffi-
ciently high to prevent noncompliance. For example, the minimum fines with a 3%
monitoring frequency range from about $10/acre in Wisconsin to about $66/acre in Hall
County, Nebraska; but with a 30% monitoring frequency, the minimum fines range from
approximately $1 to $8/acre in these same locations.
Program Comparisons
Using payments to growers, grower welfare, and monitoring frequency, table 4 compares
compliance programs assuming CARA utility. In these terms, no program Pareto domin-
ates another. As an alternative, the net benefit of each program is calculated as grower
welfare minus both payments to growers and the cost of additional monitoring. The
insurance programs include monitoring costs in the premium load, but the direct subsidy
and the fine program require additional monitoring costs. Lacking information on the
cost of this additional monitoring, the net benefit of the direct subsidy and fine programs
exclusive of additional monitoring costs is calculated. Unlike the Pareto criterion, this net
benefit criterion ignores the distribution of benefits and costs. The last column of table 4
reports the net benefits of each program using this criterion. The net benefit exclusive of
additional monitoring costs is the same for the direct subsidy and fine programs because,
with CARA utility, the subsidy expenditure exactly offsets the increase in grower welfare.
Consequently, whichever program has lower monitoring costs is more efficient.
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Table 4. Comparison of Compliance Programs Assuming CARA Utility
Frequency of Net Benefit,
Payment Additional Excluding Additional
Program to Growers Grower Welfare Monitoring Monitoring Costs
Voluntary Insurance 4Mv(P - pv) CEBt 0 CEBt - )Mv(P - Pv)
Direct Subsidy Ss CEBt - Cc + Ss a CEBt - Cc
Mandatory Insurance 0 CEBt - MM(1 + PM) 0 CEBt - MM(1 + PM)
Fines 0 CEBt - Cc a CEBt - C
Notes: Mv and MM are actuarially fair premiums, and P and PM are loads for voluntary and mandatory insurance.
Table 5. Comparison of Net Benefits ($/acre) by Location, Excluding Addi-
tional Monitoring Costs for Direct Subsidies or Fines, Assuming a Premium
Load of 24.5% and CARA Utility with a 20% Risk Premium (Ra = 0.005057)
Location
Boone Co., Hall Co.,
Net Benefit Difference Deductible Illinois Minnesota Wisconsin Iowa Nebraska
<--------------------- ($/acre) --------------------- >
Voluntary vs. Mandatory Insurance:
[4MM(1 + ) - Mv(PM- P)] 10 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.16
20 0.18 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.24
30 0.27 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.43
Direct Subsidy or Fine vs. Voluntary Insurance:
[wMv(P - Pv) - Cc] 10 0.49 0.33 0.22 0.34 0.72
20 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.33
30 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.13
Direct Subsidy or Fine vs. Mandatory Insurance:
[MM(1 + PM) - Cc] DM 0.36 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.56
For ranking the other programs, the first column of table 5 reports the difference in
net benefits, exclusive of monitoring costs. These differences imply intuitive conclusions.
For example, voluntary insurance tends to be more efficient than mandatory insurance
when it has a lower load or actuarially fair premium, and when the willingness to pay
for voluntary insurance is high. Similarly, a direct subsidy or fine tends to be more effi-
cient than either type of insurance when the actuarially fair premium or the insurance
load is high, and the willingness to pay for voluntary insurance or the cost of compliance
is low.
For many crop insurance products [e.g., Multiple-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI)], 24.5%
is the federally approved premium subsidy provided to cover the cost of insurance above
actuarially fair premiums. Table 5 empirically compares the efficiency of the different
programs using 24.5% as the premium load for voluntary and mandatory insurance
(P and PM, respectively). Three different deductibles are considered for voluntary insur-
ance, while mandatory insurance uses DM, the maximum deductible that guarantees
compliance.
Based on the results from table 5, with a 24.5% load, mandatory insurance is more
efficient than voluntary insurance when the deductible for voluntary insurance is less
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than DM. But voluntary insurance is more efficient when it has a deductible greater than
DM. Sensitivity analysis with loads ranging from 10% to 150% found this result to be
robust, with the magnitude of the efficiency difference increasing with the load.
With a $10 deductible, the Monte Carlo estimated probability that the loss will exceed
the deductible ranges from 59% to 96% for the modeled locations. With a deductible of
DM at each location, the probabilities range from 21% to 87%, and with a $30 deductible,
the probability ranges between 4% and 26%. The low deductible required for mandatory
insurance to be more efficient than voluntary insurance implies frequent claim adjust-
ment in most areas, and so a high load. With higher deductibles requiring less frequent
claim adjustments, voluntary insurance is more efficient than mandatory insurance
because load subsidies to growers are reduced.
Table 5 also reports the net benefits of a direct subsidy or fine relative to voluntary
and mandatory insurance with a 24.5% load. Monitoring costs are not included in the
net benefits for the direct subsidy or fine programs. As a result, the reported values imply
a maximum monitoring budget for a direct subsidy or fine program; when monitoring
costs are below the reported values, a direct subsidy or fine program is more efficient
than insurance for enforcing compliance. However, because regulators can always choose
an inspection rate where the cost of monitoring is less than the budget indicated in table
5, they can likewise find an inspection rate such that a direct subsidy or fine program
is more efficient than either Voluntary or mandatory insurance. The only constraint is
that the fine or subsidy implied by the maximum inspection rate be politically and legally
feasible.
With a premium load of 24.5%, the implied monitoring budgets in table 5 for a $30
deductible range from $0.02/acre in Wisconsin to $0.13/acre in Hall County, Nebraska.
These budgets are per acre of all corn, not per acre of inspected refuge corn. For other
loads, the results in table 3 can be used with the equations in column 1 of table 5 to gen-
erate more budgets.
Per acre loads collected for voluntary insurance put this monitoring budget into per-
spective. Using premiums from table 3 for a $30 deductible in Hall County, Nebraska,
a 24.5% load would collect $0.13/acre, which equals the monitoring budget reported in
table 5 for Hall County, Nebraska, with a $30 deductible. This result holds for other
deductibles and locations as well-the load with voluntary insurance is slightly larger,
but the difference is less than $0.01/acre. Thus, for voluntary insurance to be more effi-
cient than direct subsidies and fines, administrative and adjustment costs must be low
or the monitoring cost must be lower than with direct subsidies or fines.
The small difference between the collected insurance load and the maximum budget
for a direct subsidy or fine program is representative of all locations and premium loads
evaluated, and robust under extensive sensitivity analysis-the maximum found was
less than $0.10/acre. This result occurs because ECB refuge insurance only minimally
reduces the standard deviation of returns. With a $10 deductible, the greatest reduction
in the standard deviation was 1.6% in Wisconsin.
The minor impact of refuge insurance on the variability of grower returns may seem
counterintuitive. Yet, as demonstrated by Horowitz and Lichtenberg, and by Pannell,
controlling or eliminating a pest can have surprising effects on yield variability. As
noted, proportional pest damage functions are widely used in conceptual and empirical
analyses. However, because pest damage is proportional to pest-free yield, total losses
due to pests tend to be greater when pest-free yields are high and vice versa, allowing
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damages to be positively correlated with returns. Thus insurance compensating growers
for pest losses tends to pay higher indemnities when yields and returns are high, and
vice versa. As a result, pest or refuge insurance does not greatly reduce the variability
of returns, and the risk benefit of insurance is small.
Discussion and Conclusion
The EPA has mandated refuge requirements for Bt corn to reduce the chance of the Euro-
pean corn borer developing resistance. Still, the EPA and other stakeholders are concerned
that growers may choose not to comply with these requirements without appropriate
incentives. While many compliance programs have been proposed (e.g., education, fines,
refuge insurance, and sales incentives), little research has been conducted to evaluate
alternatives. The purpose of this study is to begin to fill this void by examining a direct
subsidy, a fine, and voluntary and mandatory insurance programs. Each program is
assessed based on grower welfare, payments to growers, and monitoring frequency.
Our findings show all four programs can be designed to offer growers the appropriate
incentives to comply. However, each program distributes costs differently, so no single
program Pareto dominates all others. A direct subsidy program is best for growers, but
someone must pay subsidy and monitoring costs. A fine program eliminates payments
to growers, but also lowers grower welfare-particularly when compared to a direct
subsidy-and does not eliminate monitoring costs. Insurance internalizes the cost of
monitoring into the cost of the insurance, but subsidies are still required before growers
will buy this insurance voluntarily, and grower welfare is not as high as with a direct
subsidy.
Ignoring the distributional consequences of each program, we find a number of empiri-
cal regularities. With high deductibles, growers require a smaller incentive to voluntarily
purchase insurance, which reduces payments to growers but not grower welfare. As a
result, mandatory insurance is only better than voluntary insurance when deductibles
are low. Because the risk benefit of insurance for ECB losses is small, for practical insur-
ance loads (in excess of 20% of the actuarially fair premium), a direct subsidy or fine
program is better than voluntary insurance when monitoring costs are less than about
95% of the monitoring, administrative, and adjustment costs of insurance. Therefore,
a direct subsidy or fine will tend to be more efficient unless insurance providers have
relatively low administrative and adjustment costs or lower monitoring costs. Crop
insurance has little empirical effect and does not change the general results. With utility
exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion, a direct subsidy and a fine program are
equivalent. For more general risk preferences, one will typically be more efficient than
the other.
A key policy question remaining to be addressed is the distributional issue of who
should be responsible for bearing the cost of compliance with refuge mandates. Growers
benefit from resistance management because it preserves the efficacy of Bt corn and
helps to alleviate a potential tragedy of the commons. The public also benefits from
resistance management because Bt corn can reduce the use of pesticides that are
hazardous to human health and the environment. Consequently, programs shifting the
entire burden of compliance onto growers (fines and mandatory insurance) may not be
appropriate. The mechanisms explored here provide a variety of alternatives for sharing
the cost of obtaining the benefits of resistance management for Bt corn.
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Another important question remaining to be answered is whether or not the cost of
implementing a resistance management program exceeds the benefits of that program.
The wealth of literature on resistance management convincingly demonstrates a benefit,
but we are unaware of studies establishing the cost of implementing programs to secure
those benefits. Without estimates of these costs, the extent to which resistance manage-
ment programs improve welfare remains unclear.
[Received January 2001; final revision received June 2002.]
References
Babcock, B. A., E. K Choi, and E. Feinerman. "Risk and Probability Premiums for CARA Utility
Functions." J. Agr. and Resour. Econ. 18(1993):17-24.
Berry, E. C., and J. E. Campbell. "European Corn Borer: Relationship Between Stalk Damage and Yield
Losses in Inbred and Single-Cross Seed Corn." Iowa State J. of Research 53(1978):49-57.
Bode, W. M., and D. D. Calvin. "Yield-Loss Relationships and Economic Injury Levels for European
Corn Borer (Lepidoptera: pyralidae) Populations Infesting Pennsylvania Field Corn." J. Econ. Ento-
mology 83(August 1990):1595-1603.
Bullock, D., and E. I. Nitsi. "GMO Adoption and Private Profitability." In The Economics and Politics
of Genetically Modified Organisms in Agriculture, pp. 8-31. Bull. No. 809, College of Agricultural,
Consumer, and Environmental Sciences, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1999. Online.
Available at http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/wf/GMO/GMO.pdf.
Calvin, D. D. "Economic Benefits of Transgenic Corn Hybrids for European Corn Borer Management
in the United States." Public interest document supporting the registration and exemption from the
requirement of a tolerance for the plant pesticide Bacillus thuringiensis subsp. kurstaki insect control
protein as expressed in corn (Zea mays L.), Dept. of Entomology, Pennsylvania State University,
University Park, 1996.
Carlson, G. A., and M. E. Wetzstein. "Pesticides and Pest Management." In Agricultural and Environ-
mental Resource Economics, eds., G. A. Carlson, D. Zilberman, and J. A. Miranowski, pp. 268-318.
Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Chiang, H. C., and A. C. Hodson. "Population Fluctuations of the European Corn Borer, Pyrausta
nubilalis, at Waseca, Minnesota, 1948 to 1957." Annals of the Entomological Society of America
52(1959):710-24.
Chiang, H. C., J. L. Jarvis, C. C. Burkhardt, M. L. Fairchild, G. T. Weekman, and C. A. Triplehorn.
"Populations of European Corn Borer, Ostrinia nubilalis (Hbn.), in Field Corn Zea mays (L.)." Res.
Bull. No. 776, University of Missouri, Columbia, 1961.
Demetra, V., S. Brody, P. Bystrak, P. Davis, E. Debus, E. Sachs, D. Shanahan, J. Stein, R. Townsend,
and G. Wandrey. "Industry Insect Resistance Management Plan for Cryla Plant-Expressed Protect-
ants in Field Corn." Submitted to U.S. EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs, Biopesticides, and Pollution
Prevention Division, Washington DC, in support of registrations of the Crylab and Crylac plant-
expressed protectants as used in field corn, 1999. Online. Available at http://www.ncga.com/02profits/
insectMgmtPlan/main.htm.
Greene, W. H. Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1997.
Hennessy, D. A. "Damage Control and Increasing Returns: Further Results."Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
79(August 1997):786-91.
Hill, R. E., H. C. Chiang, A. J. Keaster, W. B. Showers, and G. L. Reed. "Seasonal Abundance of the
European Corn Borer Ostrinia nubilalis (Hbn.) within the North Central United States." NCR 216
North Central Regional Publication, Iowa State University, Ames, 1973.
Horowitz, J. K, and E. Lichtenberg. "Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use in Agriculture."
Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 75(November 1993):926-35.
Jarvis, J. L., T. Everett, T. Brindley, and F. Dicke. "Evaluating the Effect of European Corn Borer Pop-
ulations on Corn Yield." Iowa State Journal of Science 36(1961):115-32.
404 December 2002
Insuring Stewardship ofBt Corn 405
Lichtenberg, E., and D. Zilberman. "The Econometrics of Damage Control: Why Specification Matters."
Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 68(May 1986):261-73.
Lynch, R. E., J. F. Robinson, and E. C. Berry. "European Corn Borer: Yield Losses and Damage Result-
ing from a Simulated Natural Infestation." J. Econ. Entomology 73(February 1980):141-44.
Marsh, T. L., R. G. Huffaker, and G. E. Long. "Optimal Control of Vector-Virus-Plant Interactions: The
Case of Potato Leafroll Virus Net Necrosis." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 68(August 2000):556-69.
Ostlie, K. R., W. D. Hutchison, and R. L. Hellmich. "Bt Corn and European Corn Borer." North Central
Region Extension Pub. No. 602, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, 1997.
Pannell, D. J. "Pests and Pesticides, Risk and Risk Aversion." Agr. Econ. 5(1991):361-83.
Pollak, R. A., and T. J. Wales. "The Likelihood Dominance Criterion." J. Econometrics 47(1991):227-42.
Press, W. H., S. A. Teukolsky, W. T. Vetterling, and B. P. Flannery. Numerical Recipes in C++: The Art
of Scientific Computing, 2nd ed. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Saha, A., C. R. Shumway, and A. Havenner. "The Economics and Econometrics of Damage Control."
Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 79(August 1997):773-85.
Showers, W. B., M. B. DeRazari, G. L. Reed, and R. H. Shaw. "Temperature Related Climatic Effects
on Survivorship of the European Corn Borer." Environmental Entomology 16(1961):1071-75.
Tabashnik, B. E. "Evolution of Resistance to Bacillus thuringiensis." Annual Rev. of Entomology
39(1994):47-79.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. "Crop Production-
Acreage-Supplement (PCP-BB)." Online. Available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/
field/pcp-bba/. [Retrieved June 2001.]
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "The Environmental Protection Agency's White Paper on Bt
Plant-Pesticide Resistance Management." U.S. EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs, Washington DC,
1998.
"EPA/USDA Workshop on Bt Crop Resistance Management." Rosemont IL, 18 June 1999a.
. "Letter to Bt Corn Registrants." U.S. EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs, Washington DC, 20
December 1999b.
. "Biopesticides Registration Action Document: Revised Risks and Benefits Sections: Bacillus
thuringiensis Plant Pesticides." U.S. EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs, Washington DC, October
2000. Online. Available at http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/sap/2000/october/. [Retrieved June 2001.]
Mitchell et al.
